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FAIR ENOUGH? THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
INFORMATION (CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS) ACT 2004 
LUKE BECK* 
The need to combat terrorism has resulted in a need for changes to the legal 
process to take account of the realities of national security. One important 
change has been the introduction of legislation to govern the disclosure of 
national security-sensitive information to participants in legal proceedings. 
This, of course, raises a number of issues including concerns about 
ensuring fairness to the participants. This article considers whether the 
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 is 
consistent with the right to a fair trial found in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights to which Australia is a party. The conclusion is 
that the legislation is consistent with that right.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The Australian parliament has enacted dozens of pieces of legislation in 
recent years dealing with the topic of terrorism.1
                                                 
* BJuris, LLB(Hons) UNSW, LLM Candidate USyd; Public Servant, New South Wales. The 
views expressed in this paper are those of the author. 
 Among other things, that 
legislation has created new criminal offences and expanded the powers of law 
enforcement and security agencies. That legislation has also altered how 
information relating to national security matters is dealt with in court 
proceedings within federal jurisdiction. Traditionally, this has been a matter 
for public interest immunity claims at common law. However, following the 
ordering of a stay by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in 
a federal espionage case because a successful public interest immunity claim 
1 For a brief overview see, eg, Australian Human Rights Commission, A Human Rights Guide 
to Australia’s Counter-terrorism Laws <www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/counter_terrorism/ 
index.html>. 
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would have resulted in an unfair trial,2 parliament enacted legislation to 
govern the disclosure of information relating to national security in court 
proceedings.3
Lord Diplock once said that ‘[t]he fundamental human right is not to a legal 
system that is infallible but to one that is fair’.
 How information relating to national security matters is dealt 
with in proceedings within federal jurisdiction is now primarily a matter 
governed by the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil 
Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (‘NSI Act’). 
4
II THE SCHEME OF THE NSI ACT 
 A core aspect of a fair legal 
system is the right to a fair hearing. This is a right that is protected by 
international law. This article examines whether the NSI Act ensures that the 
requirements of a fair hearing will be met in those cases which it governs. The 
article proceeds in the following manner: first, it briefly outlines the scheme 
of the NSI Act; second, it considers the NSI Act in light of the right to a fair 
hearing at international law. It does this by considering the two key aspects of 
that right: the notion of a fair hearing; and the nature of the body before which 
such a hearing must be had. Ultimately, it will be seen that the NSI Act does 
not appear to violate those requirements. 
The object of the NSI Act is to  
prevent the disclosure of information in federal criminal proceedings and 
civil proceedings where the disclosure is likely to prejudice national 
security, except to the extent that preventing the disclosure would seriously 
interfere with the administration of justice.5
The Act defines ‘national security’ broadly to mean ‘Australia’s defence, 
security, international relations or law enforcement interests’.
 
6
                                                 
2 R v Lappas and Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001); R v Lappas (2003) 152 
ACTR 7. A summary of this litigation is provided in Australian Law Reform Commission 
‘Keeping Secrets: The Protection of Classified and Security Sensitive Information’ Report No 
98 (2004), Appendix 4. 
 Each of those
3 See Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 
2004; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 2004 
(Second Reading Speech) 29307 (Phillip Ruddock, Attorney-General). 
4 Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 385, 399. 
5 NSI Act s 3(1). 
6 Ibid s 8. 
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terms, except for ‘defence’, is also defined in broad terms.7
Part 3 of the Act establishes the regime in respect of federal criminal 
proceedings.
 
8 Where the prosecutor or defendant knows or believes that he or 
she will disclose information that relates to or may affect national security, or 
that a person intended to be called as a witness will disclose information that 
relates to or may affect national security in giving evidence or will do so by 
the mere presence of the witness, the prosecutor or defendant must give the 
Attorney-General notice in writing of that knowledge or belief.9 The court 
must also be advised in writing and on receipt of such advice the court ‘must’ 
adjourn the proceeding.10
Where the Attorney-General receives a notice from a prosecutor or defendant 
and considers that disclosure of the relevant information is ‘likely’ to 
prejudice national security, the Attorney-General has two options where the 
information is in the form of a document. First, the Attorney-General may 
give each potential discloser of the information in the proceeding any of: (i) a 
copy of the document with the information deleted, (ii) a copy of the 
document with the information deleted and a summary of the information 
attached to the document, or (iii) a copy of the document with the information 
deleted and a statement of facts that the information would, or would be likely 
to, prove attached to the document. Where any of those types of copies are 
issued the Attorney-General will also issue a certificate which describes the 
information and states that the potential discloser must not, except in 
permitted circumstances,
 
11 disclose the information but may disclose the 
copy, or the copy and the statement or summary.12
The second option available to the Attorney-General on receipt of a notice is 
to issue a certificate that describes the information and states that the potential 




                                                 
7 Ibid ss 9−11. 
 Similar options are available to the Attorney-General where the 
8 As to what is a ‘federal criminal proceeding’, see NSI Act ss 13−14. 
9 Ibid s 24. 
10 Ibid s 24(3)−(4). 
11 Ibid s 16 defines ‘permitted circumstances’. 
12 Ibid s 26(2)(a). 
13 Ibid s 26(2)(b). 
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relevant information is not in the form of a document.14 In any case the 
Attorney-General may decide not to issue a certificate.15
The Attorney-General’s certificate and its conditions are, however, in effect 
only an interim measure.
  
16 Where the Attorney-General issues a certificate the 
court must hold a hearing to decide which of a number of orders should be 
made.17 The court can order that the information, regardless of its form, may 
or may not be disclosed in the proceeding18 or, where the information is in the 
form of a document, that a copy of the document may be disclosed with the 
information deleted, with or without a summary of the information attached, 
or may be disclosed with a statement of facts that the information would, or 
would be likely to, prove attached.19
In deciding which order to make, the court must consider a number of factors 
including whether, having regard to the Attorney-General’s certificate, there 
would be a risk of prejudice to national security if the information were 
disclosed and whether any order would have a ‘substantial adverse effect’ on 
the defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing, including in particular on the 
conduct of his or her defence.
 
20 Any risk to national security must be given 
the ‘greatest weight’ in the court’s consideration.21
The hearing conducted must be closed
 
22 and if the court considers that the 
information the subject of the hearing would be disclosed to the defendant or 
any legal representative of the defendant who does not have an appropriate 
security clearance, the court may order that that person (or persons) is not 
entitled to be present at those times.23 The defendant has a right to be heard 
regarding the question of non-disclosure.24
                                                 
14 Ibid s 26(3). 
 Part 3A of the NSI Act establishes 
an equivalent scheme with respect to civil proceedings. 
15 Ibid s 26(7). 
16 Ibid s 27(1). 
17 Ibid s 27(3)−(4). 
18 Ibid s 31(4)−(5). 
19 Ibid s 31(2). 
20 Ibid s 31(7). 
21 Ibid s 31(8). 
22 Ibid s 27(5). These requirements are set out in s 29(2). 
23 Ibid s 29(3). 
24 Ibid s 29(4). 
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III THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
In 1980, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights25 (‘ICCPR’) 
entered into force for Australia. Article 14 of the ICCPR deals with what is 
often called the right to a fair hearing. The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (‘Human Rights Committee’) has described that right as ‘a key 
element of human rights protection [which] serves as a procedural means to 
safeguard the rule of law’.26 In the view of Judge Patrick Robinson, President 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, it is 
‘beyond dispute’ that Article 14 reflects customary international law.27
Whilst Article 14 is not included in the list of non-derogable provisions in 
Article 4 of the ICCPR, this does not mean that all of the protections it 
provides for can be derogated from. The Human Rights Committee has said: 
‘The guarantees of fair trial may never be subject to measures of derogation 
that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights.’
  
28 The Human 
Rights Committee has also stated that ‘the principles of legality and the rule 
of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected 
during a state of emergency’.29 The President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has also suggested that aspects of the 
right to a fair hearing may be jus cogens in character.30 Thus, at least some of 
the protections provided for are particularly important in human rights 
terms.31
                                                 
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).  
  
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32: Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 90th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3 (23 August 2007) [2] 
(‘General Comment No 32’). 
27 Judge Patrick Robinson, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific 
Reference to the Work of the ICTY’ (2009) 3 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 
1, 5. 
28 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [6]. 
29 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 1950th 
mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001, adopted 24 July 2001) [16]. 
30 Robinson, above n 28, 7. 
31 Schmid has attempted to identify which protections are non-derogable. See, eg, Evelyn 
Schmid, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in Times of Terrorism: A Method to Identify the Non-
Derogable Aspects of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
(2009) 1(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law 29; and Evelyne Schmid, The Right to a 
Fair Trial in States of Emergencies: Non-Derogable Aspects of Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Masters Thesis, Tufts University, 2008) 
<http://hdl.handle.net/10427/52891> . 
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Australia has in place a number of reservations with respect to Article 14. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this article to consider the validity of those 
reservations, it is sufficient for present purposes to note that there is no 
reservation with respect to paragraph 1 of the Article. The first two sentences 
of that paragraph provide:  
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.  
The NSI Act will be considered with respect to (i) the requirement of a fair 
hearing, and (ii) the requirement that such a hearing be conducted by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. By the 
terms of Article 14, those requirements apply both to criminal and civil 
proceedings.32
IV THE REQUIREMENT FOR A FAIR HEARING 
 
The fair hearing requirement is a core component of Article 14. It is, however, 
well-established that fairness is not an inflexible concept. Thus, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has said, ‘Due process of law requires that the 
proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. It 
is fairness with reference to particular conditions or particular results.’33 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has held that a fair hearing 
guarantee ‘does not impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied 
irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances’.34 But this does not mean 
that there are no minimum requirements. The House of Lords, considering the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights)35 fair hearing obligation,36
                                                 
32 On the meaning of ‘rights and obligations in a suit at law’ see General Comment No 32, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [16]−[17]. 
 has held 
33 Snyder v Massachusetts 291 US 97, 116 (1934). 
34 A v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29 [203].  
35 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
36 Ibid art 6. 
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that ‘the concept of fairness imports a core, irreducible minimum of 
procedural protection’.37
The question therefore is: do the procedures provided for by the NSI Act 
enable a hearing to be held that can, in all of the circumstances, be described 
as satisfying the minimum requirements of fairness? That question must be 
asked and answered twice since two distinct hearings are relevant. The first is 
the hearing under the NSI Act in which the court determines whether or not, 
and if so, in what form, disclosure of national security information may be 
made. The second is the substantive criminal or civil proceedings to which the 
disclosure hearing is related. Both the Human Rights Committee
  
38 and the 
European Court of Human Rights39
To answer that question, the minimum requirements of fairness must be 
identified. Among other things, a fair hearing obviously includes a right to be 
heard. Stated more fully, it is a right to be heard with respect to the 
determination of any criminal charge, or of rights and obligations in a suit at 
law. This principle is often referred to as being part of the requirement of 
‘equality of arms’ — the requirement that both sides of the argument should 
be on a relatively similar procedural footing.
 have considered that the fair hearing 
obligation extends to the pre-trial stage of substantive proceedings. 
40
If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must 
carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made 
against him … and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or 
contradict [that case].
 Sixty years ago, Lord Denning 
captured the gist of what appears to be the position at international law with 
respect to a fair hearing when he said in a different context: 
41
                                                 
37 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 [43]; Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 [12]. 
 
38 Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 138/1983: Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 27th sess, UN Doc CPR/C/27/D/138/1983 (26 March 1986) annex [8.2].  
39 Imbrioscia v Switzerland (1993) 275 Eur Court HR (ser A) [36]. 
40 De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium [1997] I Eur Court HR [53]. It should be noted that the 
Human Rights Committee on some occasions appears to consider that ‘equality of arms’ is a 
protection ‘in addition to the principles mentioned in the second sentence of Article 14, 
paragraph 1’: General Comment No 32 [8]; whereas on others, it considers ‘equality of arms’ 
to be part of that protection: Human Rights Committee, Decision: Communication No 
207/1986, 36th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/36/D/207/1986 (28 July 1989) annex [9.3] (‘Morael v 
France’); Human Rights Committee,  Decision: Communication No 514/1992, 53rd sess, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/53/D/514/1992 (26 April 1995) annex [8.4] (‘Fei v Colombia’). 
41 Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322, 337. 
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This understanding of what a fair hearing entails, as it exists in international 
human rights law, is not new. In 1978 the European Commission on Human 
Rights held that it is a requirement of a fair hearing that ‘both sides of the case 
are heard’.42
reiterate[d] that the principle of equality of arms — a component of the 
broader concept of a fair trial — requires that each party must be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place 
him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.
 Likewise, in 1997 the European Court of Human Rights  
43
In more recent times, the European Court of Human Rights has considered the 
impact of non-disclosure of evidence on the right to a fair hearing in a 
national security context. 
  
In Chahal v United Kingdom44 the European Court of Human Rights 
considered a judicial procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of detention 
pending deportation that did not involve the affected individual being 
provided with even a general summary of the allegations against him and 
which did not involve any element of adversarial argument before a court. It 
was held that that procedure could not lead to a valid determination of the 
lawfulness of detention by a court as required by Article 5(4) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In A v United Kingdom,45 a Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights considered the general fair hearing 
obligation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Court noted, as it had done before, that in limited circumstances, including 
those relating to national security, full disclosure of evidence and ordinary 
adversarial argument may not always be possible.46 The Court held, however, 
that there will not be fair hearing ‘unless any difficulties caused to the 
defendant by a limitation on his rights are sufficiently counterbalanced by the 
procedures followed by the judicial authorities’.47
The Court considered that:  
  
it was essential that as much information about the allegations and evidence 
against each applicant was disclosed as was possible without compromising 
national security or the safety of others. Where full disclosure was not 
                                                 
42 Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v Federal Republic of Germany (1978) 14 Eur Comm HR 91 [21] 
43 De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium [1997] I Eur Court HR [53]. 
44 [1996] V Eur Court HR 1831. 
45 (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 
46 Ibid [205]−[206]. 
47 Ibid [205]. 
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possible, ... [the fair hearing obligation] required that the difficulties this 
caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant still had the 
possibility effectively to challenge the allegations against him.48
The Court went on to recognise that the use of ‘special advocates’ could be a 
useful counterbalance to a lack of full disclosure and ordinary adversarial 
argument. 
 
49 A special advocate may see the confidential material and make 
submissions in the affected person’s interests, including with respect to that 
material, while at the same time not disclosing that material to the person or 
their ordinary legal representatives.50
However, the special advocate could not perform this function in any useful 
way unless the detainee was provided with sufficient information about the 
allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the 
special advocate.
  The Court continued: 
51
Whether this has occurred ‘must be decided on a case-by-case basis’.
 
52 The 
Court suggested that where most of the evidence remains undisclosed but 
where ‘sufficiently specific’ allegations are put to the individual, such as that 
he attended a particular terrorist training camp at a stated location between 
stated dates, it should be possible for the individual to provide instructions 
relevant to rebutting the undisclosed evidence, such as an alibi or an innocent 
explanation for his presence there.53
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights was applied by the 
House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF.
 
54
must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to 
enable him to give effective instructions ... [to his special advocate] in 
 The 
House of Lords held, consistently with the decision of the European Court, 
that a person: 
                                                 
48 Ibid [218]. 
49 Ibid [233].The use of other techniques has also been suggested in Chahal v United Kingdom 
[1996] V Eur Court HR 1831 [131]. 
50 See, eg, Martin Chamberlain, ‘Special Advocates and Procedural Fairness in Closed 
Proceedings’ (2009) 28(3) Civil Justice Quarterly 314; United Kingdom, Treasury Solicitor’s 
Department (2006) Special Advocates: A Guide to the Role of Special Advocates and the 
Special Advocates Support Office (SASA), <www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/SiteCollection 
Documents/Special_Advocates.pdf>. 
51 A v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29 [220]. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 [2009] UKHL 28. 
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relation to those allegations. Provided that this requirement is satisfied there 
can be a fair trial notwithstanding that the ... [affected person] is not 
provided with the detail or the sources of the evidence forming the basis of 
the allegations.55
It follows that ‘non-disclosure cannot go so far as to deny a party knowledge 
of the essence of the case against him’.
  
56
There is other support for the European position that a fair hearing requires 
disclosure of the essence of the case against a person and an opportunity to 
effectively challenge that case. The Human Rights Committee has said that 
each side in a proceeding must be ‘given the opportunity to contest all the 
arguments and evidence adduced by the other party’,
 
57 and that arguments 
must be ‘open to challenge by the parties’.58 Similarly, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism in his 2008 report noted 
that it is a requirement of a fair hearing that ‘the person concerned [must be 
allowed] to answer the case [made against him or her]’.59 The Special 
Rapporteur also noted that the right includes the right ‘to be aware of, and 
[be] able to respond to, the case’.60 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has held that ‘a fair hearing requires that the affected person be informed of 
the case against him or her, and be permitted to respond to that case’.61
Turning now to the NSI Act, can it be said that the Act allows an affected 
person to be informed of the essence of the case against him or her and 
ensures an opportunity to effectively challenge that case? 
 
A The Disclosure Proceedings 
In relation to the disclosure hearing, section 29(4) of the NSI Act provides: 
If, at the hearing, the prosecutor or ... [the Attorney-General or his or her 
legal representative] argues that any information should not be disclosed, or 
                                                 
55 Ibid [59]. 
56 Ibid [65]. 
57 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [13]. 
58 Morael v France, UN Doc CCPR/C/36/D/207/1986 , annex [9.4]. 
59 Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur, Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, GA Res 62/159, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 67 (c), UN Doc 
A/63/223, (6 August 2008), [38]. 
60 Ibid [45]. 
61 Charkaoui v Canada [2007] 1 SCR. 350, [52]. 
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that the witness should not be called to give evidence, in the proceeding, the 
defendant and any legal representative of the defendant must be given the 
opportunity to make submissions to the court about the argument that the 
information should not be disclosed or the witness should not be called. 
On its face, that provision appears to allow an affected person to be heard as 
to whether or not there should be disclosure. Indeed, it mandates such a 
course through the use of the word ‘must’. As a matter of construction, it 
would appear that the essence of the ‘argument that the information should 
not be disclosed or the witness should not be called’ must be disclosed to the 
affected person. The provision does not provide merely an opportunity to 
make submissions to the court about the general issue of disclosure. Rather, it 
provides a more specific right to make submissions to the court ‘about the 
argument’ for non-disclosure. For that opportunity to be meaningful the 
essence of the argument for non-disclosure must be made known. Indeed, how 
could an affected person make submissions about an argument of which the 
person knows nothing?  
Moreover, it would not be sufficient to disclose the essence of the argument 
only to an affected person’s legal representative since ‘the defendant and any 
legal representative of the defendant’ are entitled to be heard. This 
requirement would not seem to be overridden by the power given to the court 
to exclude the affected person and his or her legal representatives from the 
hearing whilst details of the national security information are given to the 
court.62 The provision requires that the essence of the argument against 
disclosure be disclosed to the affected person and his or her legal 
representatives, albeit in a manner that does not disclose the information 
subject to the argument against disclosure. It should also be noted that the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales has considered that the expression ‘any 
legal representative of the defendant’ is wide enough to include a special 
advocate who may be given greater disclosure and who may be present when 
the sensitive information is discussed.63
The NSI Act non-disclosure procedure compares favourably with the 
Canadian approach. Under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act
 
64
                                                 
62 NSI Act s 29(3). 
 there is a 
requirement of participants in proceedings to notify the Attorney-General if 
they intend to rely upon information that may injure national security. The 
initial stages of the procedure are similar to the NSI Act procedure. The 
Attorney-General may authorise disclosure, including disclosure subject to 
63 R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 475 [29]. 
64 RSC 1985, c C-5. 
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conditions, or may apply to the Federal Court of Canada for a non-disclosure 
order. If the Federal Court considers that disclosure of the information would 
not be injurious to national security, it may order the disclosure of the 
information. If the Federal Court considers that disclosure would be injurious 
it may authorise the disclosure of all the information, part of the information, 
a summary of the information and an admission of facts relating to the 
information subject to conditions designed to limit any injury to national 
security. Alternatively, the Federal Court may confirm the prohibition on 
disclosure. An affected person has no right to make submissions with respect 
to the question of disclosure.65 Even if the Federal Court orders disclosure, the 
Attorney-General may issue a certificate prohibiting disclosure which takes 
effect despite the decision of the Federal Court.66 That certificate may only be 
varied by the Federal Court of Appeal on the ground that the information 
covered by it does not relate to national security.67
The Australian legislation appears to provide a more reasonable procedure for 
the determination of the question of disclosure of national security-sensitive 
information. It demands adversarial argument, with the affected person having 
knowledge of the arguments against disclosure, whereas the Canadian 
legislation does not. The Australian disclosure hearings would appear to 
satisfy the international law requirements that the essence of the case be 
disclosed and an opportunity provided to contest that case. The same 
conclusion is not obviously correct for the Canadian regime. 
 
B The Substantive Proceedings 
The more important issue, however, is whether the substantive proceedings to 
which the disclosure proceedings relate involve a fair hearing. Section 19 of 
the NSI Act provides, in part, that:  
The power of a court to control the conduct of a federal criminal 
proceeding, in particular with respect to abuse of process, is not affected by 
this Act, except so far as this Act expressly or impliedly provides 
otherwise.68
                                                 
65 Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, ss 38.04(5), 38.08. Although where this is the case 
there is an automatic review of the court’s decision by the Federal Court of Appeal. There is 
again no right for the affected person to make submissions at this stage. 
 
66 Ibid s 38.13. 
67 Ibid s 38.131. 
68 NSI Act s 19(1). Section 19(3) provides the same in relation to civil proceedings. 
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Section 19 also specifically states that a non-disclosure order does not prevent 
a court from staying a matter if non-disclosure ‘would have a substantial 
adverse effect on a defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing’ in a federal 
criminal proceeding or ‘would have a substantial adverse effect on the 
substantive hearing’ in a federal civil proceeding.69 Likewise, the Canada 
Evidence Act also empowers a court to stay proceedings if non-disclosure 
would make it impossible to hold a fair criminal trial.70
One critical commentator has asked with respect to the final eleven words 
quoted above: ‘Does this betray an admission that the drafter was aware that 
the provisions of the Act can be seen as an abuse of process?’
  
71 Whatever the 
answer to that question may be, the provision must be read in conjunction 
with the decision of the High Court in Dietrich v The Queen,72 the effect of 
which is that a court has power to order a stay of proceedings, including a 
permanent stay, where this is necessary to prevent an unfair criminal trial.73 
Indeed, in a criminal trial subject to the operation of the NSI Act, the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, in the context of considering an attack on the 
constitutionality of the Act, noted that ‘[t]he traditional protections given to an 
accused person are not put aside by the legislation’.74
It is obvious that a non-disclosure order, or an order preventing a witness from 
testifying, may result in an unfair trial for a number of reasons. Such an order 
may mean that a criminal defendant does not know the essence of the case 
against him or her. It may also prevent a defendant from mounting a proper 
defence, thus impairing his or her ability to effectively challenge the case put 
against him or her. This plainly does not satisfy the requirements for a fair 
hearing under Article 14 of the ICCPR. The question is, however, whether the 
power of the court to stay the proceedings erases or prevents the unfairness. In 
criminal cases it probably does since a stay will mean there is no chance of a 
conviction or criminal punishment. Indeed, a stay will mean that there is no 
hearing at all.  
  
This problem arises also in civil proceedings. One former President of the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (now the Australian 
Human Rights Commission) put the issue in this way: 
                                                 
69 Ibid s 19(2), (4). 
70 Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5,  s 38.14. 
71 Anthony Gray, ‘Alert and Alarmed: The National Security Information Act (Cth) (2004)’ 
(2005) 24(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 91, 106 n 68. 
72 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
73 R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 475 [90].  
74 Ibid [85]. 
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The power to stay proceedings would be of no comfort to a plaintiff who 
seeks a remedy in civil proceedings in respect of executive action that it 
alleged to be illegal or an abuse of process. A stay would simply defeat the 
action and leave the plaintiff without a remedy.75
Accordingly, the chief problem with respect to civil proceedings arises where 
the person to whom disclosure is sought to be denied is the plaintiff or 
applicant. A civil defendant is in much the same position as a criminal 
defendant. This is especially important since a ‘civil proceeding’ is defined to 
mean any proceeding which is not a criminal proceeding,
  
76
It is important to recognise the task of the court in deciding whether to make a 
non-disclosure order in a civil proceeding, and particularly to distinguish it 
from that same task in a criminal proceeding. Section 38L of the NSI Act 
requires a court, in considering whether to make a non-disclosure order, to 
consider a number of matters. The first is whether there would be a risk of 
prejudice to national security if the terms of the Attorney-General’s certificate 
were not complied with. The second matter is whether any non-disclosure 
order ‘would have a substantial adverse effect on the substantive hearing in 
the proceeding’. The court may also have regard to any other matter it 
considers relevant. The NSI Act defines ‘substantial adverse effect’ to mean 
‘an effect that is adverse and not insubstantial, insignificant or trivial’.
 thus including 
serious matters such as control order cases.  
77 The 
second matter to be considered in relation to criminal proceedings is slightly 
different: whether a non-disclosure order would have a substantial adverse 
effect on the defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing.78
The difference between the two matters is important. The criminal proceeding 
matter is limited to any substantial adverse effect on the right to receive a fair 
hearing. The civil proceeding matter is not so limited and extends to any 
substantial adverse effect on the substantive proceeding generally. It could 
hardly be argued that defeating an action is not a substantial adverse effect on 
the substantive hearing. In contrast, defeating a criminal action is unlikely to 
result in a complaint from a criminal defendant. Thus, in determining whether 
to make a non-disclosure order in a civil proceeding, the court will need to 
consider whether the order will have the effect of defeating the action. Whilst 
this consideration may not result in an order for disclosure, this does not 
  
                                                 
75 John von Doussa, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and Counter-terrorism – A Crucial Challenge’ 
(2006) 13 James Cook University Law Review 104, 118. 
76 NSI Act s 15A. 
77 Ibid s 7. 
78 Ibid s 31(7)(b). 
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render the proceedings unfair. The affected person will have been heard and 
the adverse effect of non-disclosure considered. Nor does it infringe the right 
of access to the courts, which is protected by the first sentence of paragraph 1 
of Article 14 of the ICCPR. This is because the Human Rights Committee has 
interpreted the right of access to mean that ‘no individual ... [may be] 
deprived, in procedural terms, of his/her right to claim justice’.79 The 
italicised words are important. The NSI Act does not in procedural terms 
deprive any individual or category of individual from commencing civil 
proceedings. Equally, the NSI Act does not have the purpose or effect of 
‘systematically frustrat[ing]’ a particular individual’s attempts to access the 
courts80
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the ‘right [of 
access to a court] is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations’.
 since it is a statute of general application.  
81 Such 
limitations must not impair the ‘very essence’ of the right and must pursue a 
legitimate aim, with a reasonable proportionality existing between the means 
employed to effect the limitation and the aim sought to be achieved.82 The 
NSI Act does not impair the very essence of the right of access to the courts in 
that it does not prevent the commencement of any proceedings but, rather, 
merely provides a procedure for determining whether certain sensitive 
information should be disclosed. The Act requires the potential of defeating an 
action by a non-disclosure order to be considered before such an order is 
made. It does not appear to be the case that a system whereby a court makes a 
non-disclosure order after considering the effect of such an order is a 
disproportionate means of achieving the aim of guarding against risks of 
prejudice to national security.83
                                                 
79 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [9] (emphasis added). 
 
80 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [9]; Human Rights Committee, Views: 
Communication No 468/1991, 49th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 
(10 November 1993, adopted 20 October 1993) annex [9.4] (‘Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial 
Guinea’). 
81 Kulikowski v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application no 
18353/03, 19 May 2009) [58]. 
82 Ibid. 
83 NSI Act s 3. 
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V THE REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION BY A 
COMPETENT, INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL 
ESTABLISHED BY LAW 
The second core protection of Article 14 requires that the determination of 
any criminal charge, or of rights and obligations in a suit at law, be by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The Human 
Rights Committee considers this to be ‘an absolute right that is not subject to 
any exception’.84 At the outset, it can be stated that the NSI Act does not seek 
to have any issue determined by a tribunal that is not competent (in the sense 
of being properly possessed of jurisdiction)85
A Independence 
 or established by law. What 
needs to be considered is whether the NSI Act requires the determination of 
issues by a tribunal that is not ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’. 
The Human Rights Committee has held that the requirement of independence 
refers to a number of important guarantees. Most relevantly for present 
purposes, the requirement of independence includes ‘the actual independence 
of the judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and 
legislature’ and the inability of those entities to ‘control or direct’ the 
judiciary in the performance of its functions.86 The European case law also 
indicates that the executive must not be able to issue instructions to the 
judiciary in its adjudicatory function.87 The European Court of Human Rights 
has also considered that the appearance of independence is required.88
In Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights 




                                                 
84 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [19]; Human Rights Committee, 
Decision: Communication No 263/1987, 46th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987  
(2 November 1992) annex [5.2] (‘Gonzalez del Rio v Peru’). 
 A Board of Visitors is a lay tribunal established to hear 
85 Richard B Lillich, ‘Civil Rights’ in Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H Weston (eds)  Human 
Rights in the World Community, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 3rd ed, 2006), 93, 100. 
86 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [19]. 
87 Stephanos Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: An Analysis of the Application of the Convention and 
Comparison with Other Instruments, 139. 
88 Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (1984) 80 Eur Court HR (ser A) [78]; Delcourt v 
Belgium (1970) 11 Eur Court HR (ser A) [31]; Bryan v United Kingdom (1995) 335-A Eur 
Court HR (ser A) [38]. 
89 Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (1984) 80 Eur Court HR (ser A). 
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and determine disciplinary proceedings against prisoners. In the course of 
rejecting the complaint for a number of reasons, the Court referred to the fact 
that the Home Office had issued guidelines as to the conduct of Board 
proceedings. The guidelines in question were contained in a booklet entitled 
‘Procedure for the Conduct of an Adjudication by a Board of Visitors’ and 
concerned the general steps to be followed in conducting an adjudication.90 
The Court said: ‘[A]lthough it is true that the Home Office may issue Boards 
with guidelines as to the performance of their functions…, they are not 
subject to its instructions in their adjudicatory role.’91
It has been argued that the role of the court under the NSI Act in making 
orders on the question of disclosure of information is mere ‘window dressing’ 
and a ‘sham’ that disguises the reality that the court’s decision-making is 
controlled by the executive.
 This is consistent with 
the position of the Human Rights Committee that independence requires an 
absence of control or direction in the exercise of a court’s adjudicatory 
functions. 
92
In R v Lodhi,
 If this is correct then the Article 14 requirement 
of independence is not satisfied. Section 31(7) of the NSI Act provides that in 
deciding whether to make a non-disclosure order, and, if so, in what form, a 
court must consider three matters. First, whether, having regard to the 
Attorney-General’s certificate, there would be a risk of prejudice to national 
security if non-disclosure in the form outlined in the certificate is not required. 
Second, whether the order to be made would have a substantial adverse effect 
on the defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing, including in particular an 
effect on the conduct of his or her defence. Third, any other matter the court 
considers relevant. Section 37(8) provides that ‘[i]n making its decision, the 
Court must give greatest weight’ to the first matter. Section 38L(7) and (8) is 
in similar terms for the purposes of federal civil proceedings. 
93 the Supreme Court of New South Wales had occasion to 
consider the operation of section 37(7) and (8). Justice Whealy rejected the 
argument that the discretion in section 31 was simply a pretended discretion. 
His Honour considered that ‘there is no suggestion, on the proper construction 
of s 31(7) and (8) that the certificate is conclusive or determinative of the 
issue’ and that ‘the Court is free to form a view that is entirely contrary to the 
tenour of the certificate’.94
                                                 
90 Ibid [35]. 
 His Honour also held that ‘[r]ead fairly, it seems to 
me that the legislation does no more than to give the Court guidance as to the 
91 Ibid [79]. 
92 See R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 475 [57], [105]. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid [105]. 
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comparative weight it is to give one factor when considering it alongside a 
number of others’.95
It is no doubt true that in theory the National Security Information 
(Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 does not direct the court to 
make the order which the Attorney wants. But it goes as close to it as it 
thinks it can. It weights the exercise of the discretion in favour of the 
Attorney-General and in a practical sense directs the outcome of the closed 
hearing. How can a court realistically say I am going to make an order in 
favour of a fair trial even though, in exercising my discretion, I give the 
issue of fair trial less weight than the Attorney-General’s certificate. 
Imagine the appellate fate of a custody order where the trial judge has said I 
give custody to the father although his claim has less weight than that of the 
mother.
 If this interpretation is correct, then the NSI Act would 
not appear to control or direct the court in the exercise of its adjudicatory 
functions. However, this interpretation has been contested. Michael McHugh, 
a former judge of the High Court of Australia, has said: 
96
Gray, an academic commentator, has suggested that ‘[w]hile the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial is specifically mentioned as a factor [to be taken into 
account], the matter to which most weight must be given is the Attorney-
General’s certificate’.
 
97 Gray also comments that ‘a court cannot be asked in 
one breath to consider a matter, but in the next breath be told that the view of 
the Attorney-General on the matter is the overriding consideration. That does, 
with respect, appear to place judges in a position of subservience to the 
executive.’98
It appears that the concerns of McHugh and Gray are both in important 
respects misconceived. The matter to which most weight must be given is not 
the Attorney-General’s certificate. Sub-section 8 provides that the matter to 
which most weight is to be given is whether there would be a risk of prejudice 
to national security if the terms of the certificate were not complied with. In 
answering that question, the court must only have ‘regard’ to the Attorney-




                                                 
95 Ibid [108]. 
 Thus, in the words of Whealy J, ‘the legislation does no more than to 
96 Michael McHugh, ‘Constitutional Implications of Terrorism Legislation’ (2007) 8 Judicial 
Review 189, 209.  
97 Gray, above n 71, 98. 
98 Ibid 100. 
99 NSI Act s 27(1) makes clear that the certificate is only so conclusive up until the 
commencement of the hearing in which the court considers whether or not to make a non-
disclosure order. 
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give the Court guidance as to the comparative weight it is to give one factor 
when considering it alongside a number of others’.100




[t]he existence of such guidance, even if it can be said to tilt the balance in 
favour of a particular decision, does not fundamentally alter the task … [I]t 
is important to recognise that tilting the balance by some form of guidance 
is perfectly consistent with the traditional judicial decision making 
process.
 The Court of Criminal Appeal considered that, while sub-
section 8 guides the court in its task of balancing the competing interests 
identified in sub-section 7,  
102
Whilst the guidance given by sub-section 8 goes beyond that provided in 
Campbell and Fell, which concerned procedural steps, the guidance does not 
amount to an instruction since the court is required to come to its own 
conclusion about the relevant risk of prejudice to national security and then 
about the question of disclosure. It is not instructed to make a particular 
finding. It is not subject to external control or direction. The independence of 
the court therefore does not appear to be impaired by sub-section 8. Whether, 
as a matter of public policy, there should be less guidance given to the court is 
a separate question. 
  
Furthermore, the decision of the court as to disclosure is not open to reversal 
by the executive.103 If it were, then questions might arise as to the true 
independence of the court. This is because ‘the power to give a binding 
decision which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority’ is a component 
of independence.104
                                                 
100 R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 475 [108].  
 This requirement appears to be violated by the regime 
established in Canada by the Canada Evidence Act 1985 which, while giving 
power to the Federal Court of Canada to make orders regarding non-
disclosure of national security sensitive information to a defendant, also 
empowers the Canadian Attorney-General to issue a non-disclosure certificate 
prohibiting disclosure which takes effect even in the face of a court decision 
101 Lodhi v The Queen (2007) 179 A Crim R 470 [36].  
102 Ibid [41]. See also [45], [67], [73]. 
103 In the face of an order under the NSI Act requiring disclosure, the executive could only 
avoid that obligation in a criminal proceeding by discontinuing the prosecution in order to 
avoid the occasion for disclosure. This is plainly not the same as reversing the order. 
104 Van de Hurk v Netherlands (1994) 288 Eur Court HR (ser A) [45]; Findlay v United 
Kingdom [1997] I Eur Court HR [77]. 
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in favour of disclosure.105
B Impartiality 
 Unlike the situation under the Australian 
legislation, the decision of a Canadian court as to disclosure stands only if the 
Attorney-General allows it to. 
The next issue to be considered is whether the NSI Act can be seen as 
allowing the determination of a criminal charge or rights and liabilities in a 
suit at law by a tribunal that is not impartial. At first glance, the answer would 
appear to be obviously ‘no’. The requirement of impartiality has been 
interpreted by both the Human Rights Committee106 and by the European 
Court of Human Rights107 in terms broadly consistent with the bias rule in 
Australian law. The NSI Act plainly does not seek to exclude the operation of 
that rule. However, it is necessary to consider more fully the nuances of the 
international jurisprudence to reach any firm conclusion. Stavros has 
summarised the effect of the European jurisprudence relating to impartiality 
and concluded that ‘knowledge of the case acquired through … certain 
judicial functions which involve a pronouncement on the merits creates a 
presumption of bias against the judge who subsequently hears the case’.108
One of the more important European impartiality cases is Hauschildt v 
Denmark.
  
109 In that case, the applicant complained that he had not had the 
benefit of an impartial tribunal on the ground that the judge who convicted 
him made a number of pre-trial decisions relating to remand and that, 
accordingly, the judge’s appreciation of the evidence at the subsequent trial 
was coloured. The Court held that making remand decisions based on the 
existence of a prima facie case does not create an impression of partiality 
where the same judge later goes on to determine the question of guilt on the 
ordinary standard.110 The Court went on to hold, however, that ‘special 
circumstances’ in a particular case may warrant a different conclusion.111 In 
Hauschildt the judge made nine decisions regarding remand.112
                                                 
105 Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, s 38.13. 
 Each of those 
decisions required the judge to be convinced that that there is a ‘very high 
106 General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/3, [21]; Human Rights Committee, 
Decision: Communication  No 387/1989, 46th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (5 
November 1992) annex [7.2] (‘Karttunen v Finland’) . 
107 Piersack v Belgium (1982) 53 Eur Court HR (ser A) [30]. 
108 Stavros, above n 89, 155. 
109 (1989) 154 Eur Court HR. 
110 Ibid [50]. 
111 Ibid [51]. 
112 Ibid . 
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degree of clarity’ as to the question of guilt.113 The Court concluded, ‘Thus 
the difference between the issue the judge has to settle when ... [making 
remand decisions] and the issue he will have to settle when giving judgment 
at the trial becomes tenuous.’114
Under the NSI Act the trial judge is required to come to a conclusion as to the 
effect of non-disclosure of particular information on the right of a defendant 
to receive a fair hearing, including in particular on the conduct of his or her 
defence, as a step along the way to determining the issue of disclosure.
 The Court concluded that this gave rise to an 
appearance of partiality. 
115 
Depending on the view of a fair hearing adopted, there is the potential for the 
judge to act in a partial way by coming to such a conclusion. The decision of 
the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB116 
suggested, somewhat vaguely, that decisions on the question of disclosure of 
sensitive information could be based, in part, on an analysis of whether 
disclosure would make any difference to the defendant’s case.117 There was 
suggestion in the opinions of more than one of their Lordships, and later 
acceptance by first instance courts,118 that if the case for the imposition of a 
control order on the disclosed materials against a person was so cogent as to 
allow a judge to feel ‘quite sure that in any event no possible challenge could 
conceivably have succeeded’119
If this reasoning were to be applied to the analysis to be undertaken under the 
NSI Act then in doing so the judge will have effectively prejudged the 
substantive case in a manner rebuked in Hauschildt. As noted above, the 
prevailing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
House of Lords, which is consistent with that of the Human Rights 
Committee, requires disclosure of the essence of the case against a person and 
an effective opportunity to challenge that case. This rule has no room for a 
‘makes no difference’ principle.
 then the case for disclosure of sensitive 
information was weakened.  
120
                                                 
113 Ibid [52]. 
 The purpose of considering the ‘makes no 
difference’ notion is to demonstrate the potential for unfairness in the 
disclosure regime established by the NSI Act. This potential, however, is 
114 Ibid. 
115 NSI Act s 31(7)(a)(ii). 
116 [2007] UKHL 46. 
117 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46, [65], [90]; and see 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 [19]. 
118 See, eg, Secretary of State for the Home Department v AN [2008] EWHC 372 (Admin) [9]. 
119 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 [90]. 
120 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 [63]. 
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unlikely ever to be realised. The reason follows from the fact that the NSI Act 
does not seek to exclude the operation of the ordinary bias rule. Since it is the 
plain purpose of the NSI Act, in contrast to the Canada Evidence Act,121
VI CONCLUSION 
 to 
have questions of disclosure determined by the trial judge, it would be 
frustrating the purpose of the Act to interpret it in such a way as to potentially 
require a trial judge to act in a manner that would force him or her to stand 
aside from hearing the substantive case. The NSI Act therefore would not 
appear to violate the requirement of impartiality.  
The right to a fair hearing is fundamental to a free society and is protected by 
international law. At a time when heightened concerns about terrorism are 
prominent there is a risk that that right may be impaired on grounds of 
expediency. In a well known decision Sir Robert Megarry said: 
It may be that there are some who would decry the importance which the 
courts attach to the observance of the rules of natural justice. ‘When 
something is obvious,’ they may say, ‘why force everybody to go through 
the tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and giving an 
opportunity to be heard? The result is obvious from the start.’ Those who 
take this view do not, I think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has 
anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with 
examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of 
unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of 
inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable 
determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change. Nor are those with 
any knowledge of human nature who pause to think for a moment likely to 
underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find that a decision 
against them has been made without their being afforded any opportunity to 
influence the course of events.122
Ultimately, it is principles like these that underlie the right to a fair hearing 




The National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 
(Cth) altered the way in which questions relating to the disclosure of national 
 which is binding on Australia.  
                                                 
121 RSC 1985, c C-5. 
122 John v Rees [1970] Ch 345, 402. 
123 Opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976). 
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security-sensitive information in proceedings arising in federal jurisdiction are 
to be handled. The legislation, whilst perhaps not perfect, does not appear to 
violate the fundamental requirements of the right to a fair hearing. 
